We are navigating uncertain and anxious times. Russia's invasion of Ukraine dates back four years. The war on the Ukrainian plains, despite a diplomatic ballet more ridiculous than effective, continues, amid death and destruction.
Meanwhile, the giants, those once called "great powers," are busy with business, with the balances of power that best suit them, with the influence of tomorrow, with how to divide up the immense resources available today. All this, first and foremost, at the expense of tormented Ukraine, a puppet nation for Russia, difficult for the United States to understand, even more insignificant for China, and, secondly, at our expense, at the expense of Europe as a whole, crushed at the sides, a sacrificial lamb on the altar of brute force and profit. In this context, unimaginable at least until a few years ago, we are seeking explanations.
We know that reality is always more complex than what we're shown. This is why we need to carefully choose the information we draw from, avoiding facile interpretations, fanaticism, and any kind of propaganda.
Alexander Etkind is a Russian intellectual, born in 1955 in St. Petersburg, then Leningrad. A true representative of the Soviet intelligentsia, Etkind studied psychology and history. He earned two doctorates, the first in psychology in 1985, the second in 1998 in Helsinki in Slavic languages and literatures (history of Russian culture). A researcher and professor, he taught in St. Petersburg during the 90s and 2000s, then at the University of Cambridge and the European University Institute in Florence. Today, in addition to being the author of numerous essays on Russian intellectual and cultural history, internal colonization, and the national use of natural resources, he is a professor in the Department of International Relations at the Central European University in Vienna. In September 2024, Russian authorities placed him on the list of “foreign agents” (the new enemies of the people).
In 2023 Professor Etkind published a very interesting book: Russia against modernity, whose Italian translation Russia against modernity, published by Bollati Boringhieri, is available from March 2025.
Greeted by the New York Times including "“The most thought-provoking new book on the war in Ukraine,” Etkind’s latest work offers a broader perspective on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, one that revolves around the issue of raw materials.
The (apparently) infinite availability of hydrocarbons available to the Russian Federation is in open contrast with the emerging, essentially Western, policies to combat the climate crisis and support the energy transition. The imperialist historical, cultural, and sociological "motives" that seem to have pushed Russia to subjugate Ukraine are, according to Alexander Etkind, secondary, given that the crux of the matter is natural resources. And this is precisely why the book is titled against modernity, because once again we are faced with a conflict between two worlds: what Professor Etkind calls "paleomodern," represented by the oil-rich and kleptocratic states, of which Russia is a prominent exponent, and the "gaymodern," embodied by the democratic West, founded on the culture of work and production, which is attempting to find alternative energy solutions. The origin of the conflict, therefore, is no longer ideology, as in the Cold War, but rather the differing responses to the climate crisis and the use of raw materials.
In this interview we discussed it in detail with the author.
In your book, you explain the invasion of Ukraine as part of a larger objective: Russia's war against modernity, and specifically against environmental awareness, the energy transition, and digital work. So, don't you consider it a purely imperialist war by a former great power (the USSR), which, for decades, has been losing influence over its neighbors, then its republics?
"It is certainly an imperialist war, although every imperialist war is different, each has its own reasons and characteristics. I'm thinking of the opium wars in China, the wars in the Congo, or the Vietnam War.
In this case, it concerns climate change and the climate crisis. As we all know, the answer to the climate crisis is expressed through climate action, and this is essentially decarbonization. Since Russia is an oil-producing state, its primary income is derived from energy trade, specifically oil.
It's therefore clear that Europe's decarbonization plans threaten Russian profits. This is one of the reasons, in my opinion, the main one, to contextualize Russia's war against Ukraine, which began in 2014, culminated in 2022, and is ongoing today.
If so, don't you think Putin miscalculated? In response to the invasion, Europe renounced Russian oil and gas. Furthermore, the economic sanctions, after four years, are having a significant impact on the Russian economy...
Vladimir Putin has underestimated many things, and we see it every day in the press. In my book, I call this effect the "nemesis." Virtually every time, and in a manner that can almost be considered strategic, the Russian president obtains in exchange for his actions exactly what he fears most. Just consider NATO's expansion to Russia's borders. Putin was worried about it, and in fact, it is one of the results of his war, given that Sweden and Finland recently joined the Atlantic Alliance.
Nevertheless, the war continues, and Russia has found alternatives to hydrocarbon exports. Now, the majority of Russian crude oil is sold to China and India, but also to other parts of the world, making long journeys and thus creating environmental and security risks in the Baltic Sea, the Atlantic, and the Pacific Ocean. The lower prices at which resources are sold and the difficulties in transporting them negatively impact the Russian budget.
According to his thesis, Russia is positioning itself against modernity, progress, and technological advancement. All this is happening and has happened during Vladimir Putin's more than twenty-year reign. Why was Russia unable to change course when it could have done so, that is, after the fall of the Soviet Union in the 90s, the country's first truly free years?
I believe it was a contingent process. At the time, there could have been a certain type of development, a different vision of the country, but that wasn't the case; the attempt failed. Many factors contributed to this: social, cultural, and economic. Once again, even then, hydrocarbons played a key role, as the new Russia was essentially an oil state. The nature of oil states, such as the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Iran, or Venezuela, is aggressive and problematic. In countries like Switzerland or Denmark, for example, the well-being of citizens derives from the people's own work and therefore from taxes, investments in education, healthcare, transportation, etc., while in oil states, money and well-being are essentially tied to the land, the natural resources available. In such a context, citizens play a marginal role; they simply serve to extract hydrocarbons; they add nothing to the state budget; at most, they benefit from them.
How is it possible that after four years of war, a million Russian deaths, incredible human and economic sacrifices, and the price of isolation, the Russian people's support for the President is still so strong?
Personally, I don't really believe the statistics compiled in Russia. What we know for sure is that more than a million people left Russia after the war began. That's a lot, but still not enough to bring about significant change. All the money in the country belongs to the government, and everyone living in Russia is simply an "employee," a "dependent," be they soldiers, nurses, or managers. They have no right to disagree. When questioned, they say they support the special military operation because they fear for their jobs, their families, their lives. This is the epitome of oppression and dependence.
When will the war end and how?
"I believe this war will not end without a revolution."
In Russia?
I don't know, it could also be the collapse of the Ukrainian regime. I hope for a revolution in the Russian Federation. In my book, I dedicate an entire chapter to the "Russian defederation," that is, the dismantling of present-day Russia into a certain number of states. It's a prediction with an uncertain timeline: in a few years, maybe ten, maybe fifty. However, if Putin emerges victorious from this war, another will begin. In any case, at a certain point, he or his successor will be punished by the population. The regime will not survive.
What should we expect as the West and Westerners? What is the future of democracy?
Democracy is currently at great risk; I'd almost say its very existence is in danger. Most of the world isn't democratic, and in many cases, these are powerful nations—think of China, for example. Russia is trying to serve as a model for the world, and it currently seems to be succeeding quite well, especially under the Trump administration. It's difficult to imagine the future of Europe, the cradle of democracy, given that it's under combined pressure. The outlook isn't rosy.
