This premise is no longer justified. In the new global geopolitical order, the EU finds itself in a position of decline and strategic dependence. Switzerland has an interest in carefully considering the consequences of this paradigm shift before approving new agreements with the EU, which have legal, institutional, and economically strategic implications.
By virtue of its economic and commercial strength and its large market, in the era of regulated multilateralism, the EU even dreamed of becoming a third global power between the United States and China. In today's era of geopolitical competition—military, technological, for energy resources and the raw materials essential to the digital revolution—the EU can no longer claim strategic independence.
Europe is more of a land of conquest. Let's look at the data. In 2024, the EU imported nearly 60% of its energy needs. For oil, it is 90% dependent on non-EU sources, and for natural gas, 80%. Before the Russia-Ukraine war, it depended on Moscow. Today, it is dependent on liquefied gas from the United States and a Middle East at war, which for the EU means supply disruptions and price spikes that undermine European industrial production already weakened by strong Chinese competition.
The fact that the German powerhouse has abandoned nuclear power also represents a veritable hara-kiri. On the security front, having outsourced its defense to the United States and NATO for decades makes the goal of European military independence a wishful thinking, both in terms of timeframe, financial, and technological. Over the past five years, European arms imports from the US have tripled. And this isn't just military equipment in the strict sense, but weapons equipped with technologically advanced (and AI-supported) software systems to manage command, space-based satellite control, missile shields, and logistics, for which it relies on the US.
In the sector of so-called critical raw materials and rare earths, essential for the digital transition, the EU is extremely deficient and at the mercy of foreign countries, starting with China. Two years ago, Brussels adopted a plan to reduce its dependence on rare earths, but in reality it has proven ineffective. To give a revealing example, after boldly replying to Trump that Greenland should not be touched, a few weeks ago it allowed a US company, Critical Metal Corp, to snatch control of the largest rare earth deposit in Tanbreez, in southern Greenland.
As can be seen, in key sectors of the current era of geopolitical competition, the European Union lacks much strategic independence. For a supranational political construct born in 1951 from the ECSC (the Agreement on Coal and Steel, or energy and raw materials), the current situation is not a particularly brilliant result. Especially since the EU is heavily indebted and at risk of recession.
Switzerland, however, owes a great deal to the European Union. Much of our country's strong economic development depends on integration into the European single market and the added value of a European workforce essential to all Swiss economic sectors, from construction to tourism, from specialized industry to services and the advanced tertiary sector.
Switzerland—an integral part of Europe both geographically and commercially—would not be at the forefront of global research and innovation without the contribution of free movement and active collaboration with European research centers. These results have been achieved so far by minimizing the political cost of participating in the single market. True to its tradition of free trade and contractualism, Switzerland has so far rejected Association Agreements (accession to the EU and the European Economic Area) and even an Institutional Framework Agreement, which would have entailed significant legal and institutional constraints.
The path to integration chosen by the Confederation instead consisted of bilateral agreements with the EEC and then with the EU: the 1972 Free Trade Agreement on Industrial Products (a cornerstone that remains in force) and the Bilateral Agreements I and II, which cover a series of vital sectors for the country. The EU did not readily accept Switzerland's integration into the European single market on a purely bilateral basis, without significant institutional constraints. If it granted Switzerland a special status—after a ten-year purgatory following its rejection of the European Economic Area in 1992—it was only because the Confederation had submitted, prior to the vote on the economic area, an application for EU membership, which was formally withdrawn only in 2016. And because, alternatively, the Swiss Parliament and Government had decided to examine the possibility and feasibility of an institutional framework agreement, which had been discussed bilaterally since 2010.
During this long period, the EU increased its pressure on Switzerland to approve the automatic acquisition of European law and, starting in 2014, presented the Confederation with an ultimatum. However, the Confederation shelved the draft Institutional Framework Agreement due to fundamental differences that would have led to its rejection in a popular vote.
The new agreement, which will be submitted to a popular vote no earlier than the end of 2027, has been called Bilateral Agreement III, but in fact it also implies institutional constraints such as the dynamic reintroduction of European law in new sensitive or strategic sectors (primarily the free movement of people and energy supply) in which Switzerland's room for manoeuvre could be reduced or put at risk (for example, concessions for hydroelectric plants and the water rights of cantons and municipalities).
At a time of great uncertainty, when Europe is severely weakened, strategically dependent on foreign countries, and faced with the likely need to strengthen its community institutions in a more centralized manner, Switzerland must carefully evaluate whether the time is right to extend the adoption of European legal rules in areas vital to our country. One thing is clear, however: carefully weighing the decision and possibly delaying it cannot mean sitting idly by, as this would weaken our strengths.
On the contrary, we need to invest further in the fields where the Confederation excels: innovation and the transfer of research to the economic fabric. This is particularly true in cutting-edge sectors, such as artificial intelligence, where Switzerland is already highly competitive, and the future of nuclear energy (fission and fusion), breaking the hesitation of the last fifteen years. The more competitive we are in cutting-edge sectors, the greater our bargaining power will be in Europe and in the new global context.
